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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

appeals, contending the district court applied the wrong standard to
determine whether one of the alleged probation violations in his case (the failure to
complete the sex offender treatment program) was willful. Rather than being willful, that
failure was due to Mr. Barth's mental health issues, which prevented him from
completing certain aspects of the particular treatment program he was in.

He also

contends the district court abused its discretion when it determined it did not have the
authority to tailor the terms of probation to Mr. Barth's individual needs and order
probation based on a program that would take his mental health issues into account
when it revoked his probation.
The State makes several arguments in response to these claims.

However,

those arguments fail to appreciate fundamental constitutional principles, controlling
precedent, and/or the facts in the record. Because the State's responses are meritless,
this Court should reverse the district court's finding that Mr. Barth willfully violated the
terms of his probation by not completing the sex offender treatment and remand the
case for a new, error-free disposition hearing. Alternatively, this Court should vacate
the disposition order and remand this case for a new disposition under a proper
understanding of the scope of the district court's discretion therein.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Barth's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
Vvhether the
evaluation
Mr. Barth's
willful.
2.

wrong standard during its
probation violations was

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it decided it did not have the
authority to tailor the terms of probation to Mr. Barth's individual needs.

2

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Applying The Wrong Standard During Its Evaluation Of
Mr. Barth's Claim That One Of The Alleged Probation Violations Was Not Willful

A.

Because The District Court's Decision To Revoke Mr. Barth's Probation Was
Based In Part On Its Erroneous Determination That His Failure To Complete
Treatment Was Willful, His Challenge To That Determination Is Not Moot
The State contends that, because the district court found a willful violation on

another of the alleged probation violations, Mr. Barth's challenge to the district court's
conclusion that he had also violated his probation by failing to complete the sex offender
treatment program is moot. (Resp. Br., pp.9-11.) The State is mistaken.
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "an issue is not moot if it constitutes
an 'actual or justiciable controversy.' Justiciable issues are controversies that are real
and substantial and can be concluded through the grant of relief by a court."
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682 (2004)

The district court's improper consideration

of the failure to complete the sex offender treatment program in its decision to revoke
probation is a real and substantial controversy that can be concluded through a grant of
relief, namely, vacating that decision and remanding the case for a new, error-free
disposition hearing.
When considering whether to continue a defendant on probation or revoke that
probation and execute the underlying sentence following a proved violation of probation,
the district court is to examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation, such that it is continuing to protect society. See, e.g., State v. Cornelison,
154 Idaho 793, 797 (Ct. App. 2013). The district court cannot properly evaluate that

3

q

if it believes the probationer is willfully failing to complete an
in actuality,
It may

doing so
be possible for such a

to continue

rehabilitating on probation if given an appropriate treatment option which will address
those issues. (See, e.g., App. Br., p.22 (discussing Mr. Barth's motion to reconsider,
wherein he presented the district court with specific information about a treatment
program that would administer to his particular needs and issues).) When the district
court decides to revoke probation without a proper understanding of those issues, that
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion, and Mr. Barth should be afforded the
ordinary remedy for such an error.
The Court of Appeals has actually addressed the question of the proper remedy
in this type of situation before. See State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274 (Ct. App. 1995). In
that case, as here, several probation violations were alleged against the defendant. Id.
at 275.

The defendant contended the district court erred in finding one of those

allegations to be a violation of the terms of his probation.

Id. The Court of Appeals

reaffirmed that, "[w]hen a discretionary ruling has been tainted by legal or factual error,
we ordinarily vacate the decision and remand the matter for a new, error-free
discretionary determination by the trial court." Id. at 276. The only reason it did not
apply the ordinary remedy in that particular case was that the district court expressly
stated on the record that it would have revoked the defendant's probation on the other,
unchallenged violations of probation. Id. at 276-77.
In Mr. Barth's case, however, there is no such clear expression of the district
court's intent to revoke probation based solely on the other alleged violation. In fact, it

4

did

unchallenged allegation (the possession of paraphernalia allegation)

sex

on the

all, it

the
treatment

, Vol.3, p.93,

10 -

1

As such,

is none of the evidence that existed in Upton to justify not affording Mr. Barth the
ordinary remedy - remand for an error-free disposition. Therefore, relief is available for
the district court's erroneous conclusion regarding whether there was a violation of one
term of probation despite the fact that another allegation of violation was not challenged.
That means the challenge to the district court's erroneous determination is not moot.
Besides, "a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that
any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged
conviction." Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899, 900-01 (1997), abrogated on other grounds

by Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 137 (2010) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis
from Butler).

Under this exception to the mootness doctrine, this Court should still

consider the merits of Mr.

Barth's challenge to the district court's erroneous

determination. See, e.g., Freeman v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 138 Idaho 872, 875-76
(Ct App. 2003).
When this exception is in play, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the
party invoking the mootness doctrine bears the burden to show there is no possibility of
collateral legal consequences.

State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840 (2011) ("The State

has offered no such showing here.") abrogated on other grounds by State v. Wolfe, 158
Idaho 55, 64-65 (2015). As in Lute, the State has offered no showing that there is no
possibility of collateral legal consequences to an improper determination that Mr. Barth's

5

complete the treatment program was willful.

(See generally

1.)

At

rate, there are potential collateral consequences to the district court's

erroneous determination, such as the possibility Mr. Barth could be denied parole based
on the district court's erroneous characterization that he voluntarily did not participate in
the sex offender treatment program.

As the Court of Appeals has explained, "[a]n

adverse effect on an inmate's eligibility for future parole is within the class of collateral
legal consequences that prevents a case from being deemed moot" Lake v. Newcomb,
140 Idaho 190, 194 (Ct. App. 2004). Additionally:
Such consideration of an inmate's involvement in rehabilitative
programming (or refusal to do so) is within the Commission's authority [to
consider] and is one way to carry out the demand of section 20-223(c),[ 1]
that parole 'shall be ordered when, in the discretion of the commission, it
is in the best interests of society, and the Commission believes the
prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law abiding citizen."
Warren's willingness to participate in rehabilitative programs is entirely
relevant to such an inquiry.

Warren v. Craven, 152 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis omitted). Therefore,
there is a potential collateral consequence that could arise from the district court's
improper determination of whether Mr. Barth willfully violated his probation by not
completing the sex offender treatment program. As such, even if this Court determines
the issue might be moot, this exception to the mootness doctrine applies, and so, this
Court should still consider the merits of Mr. Barth's argument.

1

Renumbered in 2014 as LC.§ 20-223(4).
6

The Record Shows That Mr. Barth's Inability To Complete The Sex Offender
Treatment Program Was Due To His Mental Health Issues, And So, Did Not
Constitute A Willful Decision To Not Participate In That Program
State contends that "[t]he

[Mr.] Barth's willful misconduct

arose from his neurological issues is not ultimately relevant to the question of whether
he willfully violated his probation." (Resp. Br., p.13.) That statement not only shows the
State fails to appreciate all the evidence in the record about the nature of Mr. Barth's
symptoms, but also that it fails to appreciate the controlling statutes and legal precedent
on point. As such, its argument is wholly meritless and should be rejected by this Court.
Contrary to the State's assertion, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
Legislature requires the district court to consider the defendant's mental health issues
when making sentencing decisions. I.C. §19-2523; Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581
(1999). Specifically:
if the defendant's mental condition is a significant factor, the court shall
consider such factors as:
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill;
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment;
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;
(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required;
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public if
at large, or the absence of such risk; [and]
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the
time of the offense charged.

I.C. § 19-2523(1) (emphasis added)

Thus, Mr. Barth's ability to complete the sex

offender training because of his mental health issues is one of the statutorily-identified

7

district court is supposed to consider in making sentencing determinations.

1
we

Idaho

1 ("Idaho
stated that L

19-2523 uses
§ 19-2523 requires the trial

defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor.") Thus, the State's attempt to remove
Mr. Barth's mental health issues from the consideration is improper.
Furthermore, the State's argument - that it was Mr. Barth's "disciplinary issues
and misconduct which ultimately led to his discharge" (Resp. Br., p.13) - does not
disprove Mr. Barth's contention, supported by the various letters and reports by the
medical professionals who evaluated him (App. Br., pp.17-19 (discussing those reports
in detail), that those issues were caused by his mental health issues, not a willful
decision to not participate. The most critical piece of information in the record to this
point is the letter from Mr. Barth's treatment provider, Dr. Garner, which revealed that
Mr. Barth was attending the treatment program and trying to participate, but that "[o]ur
sessions have largely been consumed in deescalating Mr. Barth's anger and complaints
and have been relatively unproductive in dealing with sexual offender treatment issues."
(PSI, p.6.)

As Dr. Beaver, who performed the neuropsychological examination

Dr. Garner recommended

(PSI, p.8), concluded, these problems were due to

Mr. Barth's mental health issues, and that, given Mr. Barth's particular issues, the
treatment program Dr. Garner was trying to use with Mr. Barth would not be successful;
he would need a different, more individualized treatment program that took his mental
health issues into account. (PSI, p.330.)
Thus, Mr. Barth's "disciplinary issues and misconduct," as the State describes
them, were the product of Mr. Barth's struggles with his mental health issues and the

8

he was

asked to participate in a program which would not

th

As
complete

program was willful.

sex

it was

caused by factors beyond his control, namely, his mental health issues.

The State's Assertion That The Statutes Allow For Revocation On Nonwillful
Violations Of The Terms Of Probation Fails To Appreciate The Relevant
Constitutional Concerns That Are Also In Play
The State's final argument on this issue is that, while I.C.R. 33(f) requires the
violation to be willful before the district court can revoke probation, the statutes are not
so narrow in scope, and therefore, under the statutes, the district court could still revoke
Mr. Barth's probation based on a nonwillful violation.

(Resp. Br., pp.13-19)

That

argument erroneously tries to read discord between the statute, the rule, and, although
the State does not acknowledge them, the relevant underlying constitutional provisions.
When all those provisions are considered together, it becomes clear that the language
of I.C.R. 33(f) is actually the explanation of a harmonious reading of the relevant
provisions. "When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way
that results in a conflict."
quotation omitted).

State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008) (internal

Thus, the State's attempt to read discord into these harmonious

provisions is meritless, especially because its reading of the statutes would render them
unconstitutional. As such, this Court should reject the State's argument.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides: "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U S. CONST.

9

XIV, Section 1.

The Idaho Constitution has a similar,
shall

" IDAHO CONST.

life

without due

or

I, § 13. However, when assessing the deprivation of

a liberty interest, as is the case here, Idaho applies the same standard that applies to
the federal constitution. 2 Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768,771 (1996).
Since probation revocation involves the loss of liberty, the probationer has a
cognizable

interest

in

due

process

during

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-84 (1972).

the

revocation

process.

See

Furthermore, "[d]ue process and

equal protection principles converge in the Court's analysis in these cases," where there
is a question about whether an alleged probation violation is willful.

Bearden v.

Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). Thus, based on these constitutional provisions, the
Supreme Court held:
[l]f the probationer has made all reasonable efforts [to meet the term of his
probation], and yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is
fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering
whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are
available.
This lack of fault provides a "substantial reaso[n] which
justifie[s] or mitigate[s] the violation and make[s] revocation inappropriate."
Id. at 669 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court then compared its decision to Justice Powell's concurrence in
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 400 (1978), wherein the Justice "distinguish[ed]
under both due process and equal protection analyses, persons who shirk their moral

The Idaho Supreme Court has not addressed whether Idaho's constitution itself
provides more protection than the federal constitution in regard to nonwillful violations of
probation since it amended I.C.R. 33(f) in 2012. At this point, it appears Idaho's
independent protection of those rights is the product of the Court Rules and the exercise
of judicial review of the statutes in question.
2

10

obligation

pay child

from

wholly unable

pay." Bearden,
by

"[n]umerous

revocation
probation when the probationer is without fault in his failure to [comply with the terms of
his probation]." Id. at 669 n.10. As such, the willfulness requirement in the probation
revocation context is a product of the constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection.
This brings the analysis to the constitutional concerns the State ignores in
arguing that Idaho's statutes purport to give unrestricted authority to revoke probation
regardless of whether the violation was willful.

(See Resp. Br., pp.13-19.)

As the

United States Constitution itself provides, "This Constitution ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 3 U.S. CONST. Art.
VI, clause 2 (emphasis added). Thus, were the statutes to which the State points (see
Resp. Br., pp.13-16) to be read as broadly as the State contends they should, those
statutes would be in conflict with the due process and equal process protections
afforded by the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution discussed supra.
Therefore, the State's reading of the statutes would violate the fundamental authority of
the constitutions, and so, should be rejected

Idaho's Constitution has similar fundamental power: '"All the people of the State are
bound by constitutional limitations."' Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 406 (1988)
(quoting State v. Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 524 (1953)). These limitations
apply to acts of the Legislature as well. See id. at 407.
3

11

those rights and seen fit to provide

Rather, Idaho has simply
protections

constitutional floor identified

Bearden.

v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2001) (discussing Idaho's ability to provide
more protections than those afforded by the federal constitution).
simply applied the Bearden standard in probation revocation cases

Initially, Idaho

See, e.g.,

State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct App. 1994) ("Unless the state shows that the
violation was 'willful,' it is fundamentally unfair for the court to revoke probation without
first considering adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are
available."); cf. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989) ("We
acknowledge that a judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily."). 4

However, as

discussed in depth in the Appellant's Brief at pages 14-16, the Idaho Supreme Court
acknowledged the amendment to I.C.R 33(f) was the product of a concern that the
existing protections were insufficient to adequately protect the interests underlying the
rule.

(See also App. Br., Appendix A - Criminal Rules Advisory Committee Meeting

minutes, September 16, 2011, p.6 ("This is already the law but some have been
concerned about revocation of probation, particularly in the area of nonpayment of fines,
without a finding that it was a willful violation, especially since no finding of ability to pay

The State does, at least, acknowledge that Idaho's courts have interpreted the
revocation statutes in this way. (See Resp. Br., p.15 (quoting State v. Sanchez, 149
Idaho 102, 106 (2009)) ("It is true that Idaho's appellate courts have held that a trial
court must consider alternatives to imprisonment before revoking a defendant's
probation based on a violation that is 'not willful, or was beyond the probationer's
control."').) However, the State continues to argue the primacy of the statutes without
appreciating the constitutional principles underlying those decisions. (See Resp. Br.,
pp.15-19.)
4

12

required before a fine is imposed."), see generally Resp. BL (not challenging
on

point).)
embod

amendment are

constitutional issues originally acknowledged in Bearden and simply constitutes an
expression of the way in which Idaho's revocation statutes can be read harmoniously
with those constitutional provisions. This is, after all, one of the fundamental duties of
the courts: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.

Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity

expound and interpret that rule.

If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must

decide the operation of each."

Marbury v. Madison. 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)

(emphasis added). Thus, I.C.R. 33(f) and the relevant judicial decisions reveal that the
constitutional operation of Idaho's revocation statutes, and so, revocation of probation
as a functional mechanism, turns on the willfulness of the violation. See, e.g., Lafferty,
125 Idaho 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1994).
As a result, the rule and the statutes may be read in harmony so that the statutes
might be given constitutional effect.

That means both should be given full effect.

Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974 ("When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so

that there is no conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than in a
way that results in conflict.") (internal quotation omitted).
On the other hand, if this Court were to remove that critical cog as the State
contends it should, the whole mechanism will fail to work at all. In the State's scenario,
this Court would have to discard !.C.R. 33(f) in its entirety in favor of the revocation
statutes. (See Resp. Br., p.15 (calling for this result).) Then, because that would allow

13

on nonwillful violations, which would be a fundamentally unfair
this Court would
as

State's read

under

to nullify those
of the statutes is

revealed to be wholly mistaken and contrary to the most fundamental principles of law.
After all, statutes are to be read such that "effect [is] given to all the words of the statute
if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous or redundant."

Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 897 (2011) (internal quotation omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974 (rules and statutes should not
be read in discord when a harmonious reading is available).

Therefore, the State's

reading of the revocation statutes, which would render them unconstitutional, should be
rejected by this Court.
Ultimately, because Mr. Barth's inability to complete the treatment program was
not willful, it cannot be the basis of a decision to revoke his probation. Since the record
shows that the district court revoked Mr. Barth's probation primarily because of his
inability to complete the treatment program (see Tr., Vol.3, p.93, L.10 - p.102, L.7), that
decision should be reversed and the case remanded for an error-free disposition
hearing.

14

11.

The District Court's Actual Statements Reveal It Was Refusing To Consider
Ordering A Treatment Program On Probation Tailored To Mr. Barth's Individual
Needs, Which Is An Abuse Of Its Discretion
The State attempts to cast the district court's comments - "To think that we could
somehow create specialized programs for every single person based on their individual
needs and wants is simply un -- it's unfathomable, frankly, to me." (Tr., Vol.3, p.95, L.24
- p.96, L.3), and, "But we can't, and I don't -- I can't strap the jail, I can't strap probation
and parole, with some type of notion that they have to do an individual plan for you
while supervising you on probation." (Tr., Vol.3, p.96, Ls.8-13) - as merely discussing
the potential for Mr. Barth to succeed in such programs. (Resp. Br., pp.20-21.) That
argument is unavailing, as it is disproved by the actual language in the district court's
statements.
For example, the district court's comments focus on the perceived impact
requiring such a program would have on the system writ large: "I can't strap the jail, I
can't strap probation and parole, with some type of notion that they have to do an
individual plan for you while supervising you on probation." (Tr., Vol.3, p.96, Ls.8-13
(emphasis added).) Similarly, it believed that simply "creat[ing] specialized programs"
was "unfathomable." (Tr., Vol.3, p. 95, L.24 - p.96, L.3 (emphasis added).) Thus, the
district court's perspective was that the system would not allow it to order such an
individually-tailored program, not that Mr. Barth could not be successful in an
individually tailored program.

15

Instead, the district court took that improper perspective about the scope of its
such programs and applied it to Mr. Barth's case

I

special for

is]

not going to work." (Tr., Vol.3, p.99, Ls.21-24 (emphasis added).) Thus, the district
court's ultimate consideration of whether Mr. Barth could, in fact, be successful on
probation was tainted by it erroneous determination that it could not order the necessary
individually-tailored probation program in this case. Thus, the State's attempt to recast
the district court's statements as merely a consideration of Mr. Barth's ability to be
successful in such a program is disproved by the record, and so, should be rejected by
this Court.
Because it was unwilling to consider a probation plan that would actually address
Mr. Barth's needs, as it was statutorily-obligated to do, the district court failed to act
within the scope of its discretion.

(See App. Br., pp.20-22 (detailing how the district

court's decision in this regard was an abuse of its discretion).
The State's remaining arguments on this point are unremarkable, as they all
from its erroneous belief that the district court was trying to consider Mr. Barth's
potential for success, rather than, as its statements actually reveal, an inability to
formulate such a program in the first place. Accordingly, Mr. Barth simply refers the
Court back to pages 20-22 of his Appellant's Brief.
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The District Court's Failure To Consider The Individualized Probation Program
Presented In Support Of The Motion To Reconsider Highlights The Abuse Of
Discretion In Not Considering Mr. Barth's Individual Needs While Making

State's response regarding the information M

Barth presented in support of

his motion to reconsider the decision to revoke probation is unremarkable, as it is based
on the same erroneous points it made in regard to the initial decision to revoke
probation discussed in Section ll(A), supra. (See Resp. Br., pp.23-24 ("The information
attached to the I.C.R. 35 motion merely supplemented the testimony presented in
support of the housing treatment program proposed by [Mr.] Barth at the disposition
hearing ").) Accordingly, Mr. Barth simply refers this Court back to Section ll(A), supra,
and page 22 of his Appellant's Brief, which discuss the impropriety of the district court's
decision to that effect in detail.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Barth respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order revoking his
probation and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this pt day of December, 2015.

~f:~~

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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